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Classification Standards for Health
Information: Ethical and Practical
Approaches
Craig Konnoth*
Abstract
Secondary health information research requires vast
quantities of data in order to make clinical and health delivery
breakthroughs. Restrictive policies that limit the use of such
information threaten to stymie this research. While the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the new Common Rule permits
patients to provide broad consent for the use of their information
for research, that policy offers insufficient flexibility. This Article
suggests a flexible consenting system that allows patients to
consent to a range of privacy risks. The details of the system will
be fleshed out in future work.
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I. Introduction
Secondary research using health information is on the rise.
Not all informational research presents equal burdens. Yet, there
has been little commentary on the distinction between different
kinds of informational research. This Article helps remedy this
problem. In so doing, it sets out the first step towards a blueprint
for Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and other actors who must
decide what kinds of constraints to apply to different kinds of
information.
The Article first briefly explains what constitutes secondary
research of health information and outlines the problem. Second,
it points to analogous contexts in which health information is
categorized. Third, relying on Helen Nissenbaum’s approach to
privacy as contextual integrity, it argues for a “scoring”
methodology that IRBs should use in determining information
sensitivity.
II. Secondary Research of Health Information
Today, medical breakthroughs are increasingly coming from
“informational” or “secondary” research, that is, research that
aggregates information about patients, including physical
conditions, genetic information, treatments, responses, and
outcomes. This research gives researchers a real-world snapshot
at a population-wide level in a way that is not possible with
traditional clinical trials. Data from clinical contexts are fed back
into databases in a “continuous feedback loop” that iteratively
helps improve clinical and health-delivery outcomes.1 The new
form of research is prominently foregrounded in new policy
initiatives. The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Comparative
Effective Research (CER), the Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) Sentinel post-market drug surveillance programs, and the
receipt proposed changes to the Common Rule that apply to all
1. See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, INTEGRATING RESEARCH
(2014) [hereinafter INTEGRATING].
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federally funded research consciously highlight secondary
research approaches.2
This new research is important and widespread but requires
vast quantities of information. Numerous private payers, major
health systems, data intermediaries, and government entities
aggregate vast quantities of data that they use and sell to others
to, among other purposes, determine health outcomes, marketing
practices, health delivery procedures, and the like.3 For example,
agglomerating data has allowed researchers to identify genetic
mutations that presage high risks of breast cancer or
Alzheimer’s.4 Drug administration in general may change. Drug
absorption, drug distribution, drug metabolism and elimination,
drug concentration at the target site, and the receptivity of the
target receptors may vary from individual to individual based on
various factors that secondary research may well discover.5
The research also has non-clinical uses. It helps develop
necessary health quality measures and helps identify areas to
target for cost reduction. Hospital readmission rates, for example,
were found to be correlated with mental depression in
Washington, D.C. hospitals.6 This research also supports older
mechanisms, such as clinical trials, by helping identify potential
subjects that can be targeted for recruitment.7 And it renders
2. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg.
53,933, 53,938 (Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) [hereinafter
NPRM]; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes
Through Personal Comparison of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic
Health Records, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011) (noting that CER
represents a major public health enterprise, for which Congress has allocated
billions of dollars since 2009).
3. See Nicholas Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy
Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2014) (noting that big data facilitates
the creation of health data proxies).
4. For a longer list that is screenable through, for example, PGD, see
What We Test For, GENESIS GENETICS, http://genesisgenetics.org/pgd/what-wetest-for/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. See, e.g., Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and Future Drug
Development and Delivery, 355 LANCET 1358 (2000).
6. ALEX PENTLAND ET AL., BIG DATA AND HEALTH 31 (2013).
7. See Tracy Stuardi et al., Database Recruitment: A Solution to Poor
Recruitment in Randomized Trials?, 28 FAM. PRAC. 329, 329 (2011) (discussing
database recruitment); Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the Inferential Gap:
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possible investigations of situations where it would be impossible
or unethical to carry out clinical trials, including where doctors
suspect a drug has dangerous side effects, or investigating offlabel uses. These benefits are just the tip of the iceberg.
The ultimate goal is to create what policymakers call a
learning health system.8 Each clinical intervention will feed back
into centrally accessible databases. Analytics from these
databases will set standards for treating patients. These
standards will optimize treatment protocols after taking into
account numerous factors, including the individual genetic and
behavioral profile of the patient, and structural considerations,
such as cost, limits to medical infrastructure in a particular
geographical area, and staffing needs, among other variables.
Providers will treat patients depending on their profile using
these insights. The outcome from those treatments will be fed
back into the database, producing even more refined insights.
And of course, data will be used to craft policy decisions and
initiatives in areas ranging from drug approval to
reimbursement, medical curricular reform, and health
discrimination policy.9
III. The Problem
Although the fruits of collection are plentiful, information
collection imposes burdens on individuals.10 The inadvertent
release of health information can impose objective harms on
individuals if it is used inappropriately, ranging from
discrimination in employment and insurance, to reputational
The Electronic Health Record and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. 181,
182–83 (2007) (noting the shortcomings of RCTs—that they are too selective and
ignore comorbidities—and that secondary research helps bridge the gap).
8. See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO
CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 3 (2012) (noting that health
care policy improvement requires that payments for services should reward
desired care outcomes and movement toward providing the best care at a lower
cost).
9. See generally id. (explaining how health system analytics can improve
the quality of healthcare services).
10. See generally sources cited infra notes 11–12 (setting forth examples of
such burdens).
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loss. Even if these harms do not eventually occur, the
psychological discomfort that comes from the fear of
inappropriate use, whether or not it accurately estimates the risk
of these other harms, is itself a separate harm.11 Finally, even if
there is no actual information misuse, or fear of misuse,
individuals also consider privacy intrusions as disrespectful and
harmful to their autonomy.12
Nonetheless, the privacy risks from different kinds of data
are different. Existing and proposed research rules seek to take
this into account. For example, under the existing Common Rule
and under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), research with sufficiently deidentified information
can proceed unhindered. Unless the IRB grants a waiver,
researchers need to obtain specific and informed consent before
accessing information for secondary research.13
The proposed version of the Common Rule does not maintain
as strict a division between identified and deidentified data—
although HIPAA restrictions would still apply to most secondary
data. But it proposes other distinctions. For example, it
distinguishes between data collected for research and nonresearch purposes.14

11. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J.
1131, 1138–39 (2010) (noting the potential harms arising from collection of
individuals’ health information disclosures).
12. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 1008 (1989) (noting that the
right to control disclosure of intimate information is constitutive of the norms of
privacy and human autonomy). These concepts are expanded upon in Craig
Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions passim (Feb. 10, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
13. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2006); SECRETARY’S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS (SACHRP), FAQS, TERMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCH USE OF BIOSPECIMENS
(July
20,
2011),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/commsec/attachmentdfaq'stermsandrecommend
ations.pdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (answering frequently asked questions
related to relating to informed consent and research use of biospecimens) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See NPRM, supra note 2, at 53,933, 53,973 (noting the NPRM’s
proposal to distinguish between the consent required for data collected for
research and non-research purposes).
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Yet these distinctions seem to have been picked somewhat
arbitrarily. To be sure, it makes a difference whether the
information is identifiable and the purposes for which it was
collected. But these are only two criteria among a multitude of
other criteria that could be utilized. A more systematic method
for defining data sensitivity is necessary.
Looking to other arenas provides some assistance. For
example, organizations, including the federal government,
frequently adopt data classification standards that determine, for
example, whether and what data is highly classified or
confidential, internally circulable, or publicly available.15 Yet,
these standards gauge the sensitivity of information by the extent
to which agency functioning would be impaired if, inter alia,
privacy were breached. Because the standards rarely discuss the
principles behind the methodology they adopt in ways that can
apply to other contexts, they are not of much assistance.
IV. Contextual Integrity and Privacy
In order to develop this account, this Part turns to Helen
Nissenbaum’s influential explanation of contextual integrity.
Privacy involves control over the flow of information. The rules of
access and use that ultimately determine flow are determined by
context. Nissenbam argues that our lives can generally be divided
into multiple contexts, spheres, or fields.16 Social norms
recognized by most members of society as controlling dictate
appropriate behavior in those contexts. Communities are defined
by these shared norms, “common understandings and shared
interests, which . . . facilitate . . . mutual interaction” among their
members.17 The norms of the context may prescribe greater or
less access to the information depending on the context. As long
as these norms are complied with, there are no privacy intrusions
simply because information has been accessed.
15. The most important of these is the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and
Information Systems, 199 FIPS (2004).
16. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 132 (2010) (setting forth
this argument).
17. Post, supra note 12, at 991.
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Thus, for example, I may provide a doctor with certain
information that I would never give friends and vice versa. The
rules of each context are shaped by numerous forces. In some
“highly ritualized” contexts, roles and actions are guided by a
detailed set of norms; in other contexts, the norms are less welldefined.18 There may be variation in the way different individuals
or groups treat information if the norms are open-ended or if
there is disagreement. Finally, privacy norms are malleable. One
can shift norms such that information regarding a particular
issue is no longer private in a given context, and public discussion
becomes normalized.19
To determine whether privacy has been respected,
Nissenbaum considers three main, but non-exhaustive,
contextual elements:20 (1) The context, or backdrop, where the
disclosure takes place. Contexts are characterized by different
kinds of activities and values—such as medical, intimate,
educational, and other contexts. The amount and kind of
information we circulate will depend on the context. (2) The
actors involved, which include the discloser, the disclosee, and the
subject of the information. The same context may have different
actors with different roles—thus, we may release different kinds
and amounts of information to nurses, orderlies, or doctors, all in
the medical setting. (3) Transmission principles, which define the
kinds of information flow. The release may be forced, voluntary,
mutual, unidirectional, etc.21 To Nissenbaum’s account, this
Article will add one additional consideration: (4) The purpose of
the collection. A doctor reading a patient’s chart in a medical
setting would only satisfy privacy norms if the purpose of her
reading the chart was to treat the patient.

18. NISSENBAUM, supra note 16, at 129.
19. See, e.g., Matt Ferner, These Photos of Legal Recreational Marijuana
Users Shatter Stereotypes, HUFF. POST (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:32 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/photos-recreationalmarijuana_n_7075710.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (“Marijuana is being
covered by the media in an increasingly sophisticated and nuanced way now
that the laws are changing and more people are ‘out’ as marijuana users . . . .”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. NISSENBAUM, supra note 16, at 143.
21. Id. at 145.
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In the case of breach that results in a privacy intrusion, or
surveillance, there is a mismatch between the information type
and one or more of the remaining contextual elements. In the
interests of clarity, this Article shall refer to any element that
does not match with the kind of information involved as the
mismatched or intruding element. These are the elements that
take the place usually occupied by the appropriate element in the
particular interaction.
Consider the case of private medical information. If your
colleagues seek such information, there will be a mismatch of
both context and actors: Medical information generally is not
accessed in employment contexts by one’s colleagues. Similarly,
even in a medical context, the wrong kind of actor—say an
orderly—may invade your privacy by reading your medical chart.
Next, there could be a mismatch of transmission principles. A
doctor can invade your privacy by obtaining your information
using the wrong transmission principle—for example, by
threatening to withhold treatment unless you volunteer
information you otherwise do not wish to. Finally, a mismatch of
purpose can result in an intrusion, for example, where a doctor
collected medical information in a medical context but for
purposes other than treatment—say, to write a research paper
without obtaining consent.
Finally, certain circumstances can lessen or increase the risk
of a contextual violation. The key consideration is whether the
information can be traced back to the individual who provided it.
If the information can be traced back, then it becomes that much
easier to apply the information to other contexts of the
individual’s life.
V. Scoring Intrusions
This Article offers Nissenbaum’s account as a basis for a
scoring system that IRBs should use when determining the type
of risk a certain kind of research project presents. The scoring
system could consist of various attributes—five of which are
listed above. The IRB would score, not contextual variables
themselves, but rather, how much the contextual variables of the
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proposed research differ from those of the original research—
what this Article shall call the differential score.
Thus, if all or some of the original research team are involved
in the new research, or if the purpose of the new research does
not deviate sharply from the purpose of the old research—for
example, because it is examining the same disease—then the
differential score would be low. But even if the actors and the
purpose are similar, the context may change. The same
researchers may have departed from a university and may now
be working on the same disease for a commercial institution. This
change of context will increase the differential score.
But the IRB must also consider the risk that the information,
once conveyed to the new research project, may leak to other
contexts. The risk of leakage leading to violations big and small
increase dramatically to the degree the data is identified or
identifiable. Without identifiable information, it would be that
much harder to carry out even more grievous invasions, for
example, by transferring information regarding a disease to the
employment context. Because the harm that leakage may cause is
somewhat incalculable, an IRB may choose not to quantify all of
the secondary, or rather, tertiary, harms that could come from
leakage of information to yet another context. Rather, they
should assess the risk that the information may be re-identified.
In so doing, IRBs can draw from existing methodologies used in
privacy impact assessments—which themselves have drawn
limited academic attention.22 Using the scoring mechanism, the
IRB could come up with a “total score” that would determine
what procedures would need to be in place to ensure that the data
subjects are projected.
VI. Remedy
With this kind of nuanced scoring system, data subjects
should not be protected using an all-or-nothing approach. Under
22. See Roger Clarke, Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins and
Development, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 123, 123 (2009) (“Privacy impact
assessment (PIA) is a systematic process for evaluating the potential effects on
privacy of a project, initiative or proposed system or scheme.”).
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the current system, unless an individual consents, or a waiver is
granted, identifiable data is out. Under the Common Rule moving
forward, if data is not covered by HIPAA rules, there are
distinctions between whether the data was collected for research
versus non-research purposes, which tracks my suggestion that
the purpose of the original context and the new context be
compared. But overall, identifiable data could be used in certain
circumstances if the individual, when the information was
collected, offered broad consent for the information to be used for
all further research.
Under the new approach, however, individuals can offer a
more calibrated breadth of consent. Rather than being offered an
all-or-nothing approach—provide broad consent for all future
research or only limited consent for this project—they may allow
only for research that departs from the original context of
collection by a certain amount. The breadth of consent score can
be “tagged” to the information.23 Once an IRB’s scoring of a new
research project is established, only those records at or above the
IRB’s score can be (automatically) included in the research.
Problems will remain with research biases. Today, we know
that some groups of individuals are categorically less likely to
participate in research.24 Those individuals may also, under the
proposed regime, offer narrower consent systematically.
Potentially, such biases in studies can be remedied in the
following manner. IRBs can, in the right circumstances, apply to
Office for Human Research Protections or the relevant federal
agency for some sort of minority waiver, under which those
individuals in underrepresented groups who offer the broadest
consent will also be included in the study in sufficient numbers
such that the underrepresentation does not reach a certain
threshold. To be sure, that means that some individuals’
information will be included in projects to which they would not
have consented. But the approach offered by this Article is the
23. Cf. NPRM supra note 2, at 53,973 (suggesting that the information be
tagged in various ways to indicated breadth of consent).
24. See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE FOR A
LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 96 (2010) (indicating that people with potentially
stigmatizing health conditions, such as those tied to mental health, genetics, or
sexually transmitted diseases, are particularly concerned about professional
health researchers seeing their medical records).
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best approach for achieving the public interest, which sometimes
requires overriding private preferences and respecting individual
preferences, because those most averse to information collection
will not have their data used.
VII. Conclusion
This Article has offered a very brief explanation of a way to
reform the manner in which we assess data sensitivity and the
way in which we implement protections based on the scoring
system. More importantly, it has provided the ethical explanation
that undergirds this analysis. The principles offered here can
therefore be expanded upon to create an ethical but nuanced and
automated system by which to carry out secondary health
information research.

